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Imagine that, through no fault of your own, you find yourself at the bottom
of a deep well.1 Thugs have picked up an innocent person—call him Bob—
and have thrown him down the well. Bob is now falling towards you. If you
do nothing, your body will cushion Bob’s otherwise lethal fall. This will
guarantee his survival, but it will kill you. If you shoot your ray gun, you
vaporize and kill Bob, thereby saving your life. Are you morally permitted
to shoot your ray gun?
If you are, then it is permissible to kill a profiting, non-responsible
threat. Bob is a threat (as opposed to an attacker) because he endangers
your life through no immediate action of his own. He is non-responsible
because he neither intended to become a threat, nor was becoming a threat
a consequence of an intentional action of Bob’s that he could reasonably
have been expected to foresee.2 Bob profits from you because he depends
∗This paper is forthcoming as an article in the Journal of Political Philosophy. For
valuable feedback and discussions I am grateful to Brian Berkey, Alexis Elder, Jeff
McMahan, Michael Otsuka, Jonathan Parry, Jonathan Quong, and an editor as well
as two anonymous referees of the Journal of Political Philosophy. Earlier versions
of this paper were presented at the Warwick Graduate Conference, the Yale/UConn
Graduate Conference, the London-Berkeley Graduate Conference, the Brave New World
Postgraduate Conference, and at a Choice Group Seminar at the London School of
Economics and Political Science.
1This hypothetical situation is modeled on an example in Nozick, 1974, p. 34.
2This follows the use of the term ‘moral responsibility’ in McMahan, 2009, pp. 167-8.
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on your presence for his survival.3 There is no agreement among moral
philosophers whether self-defence against a profiting non-responsible threat
is permissible. In this paper, I argue that the right thing to do when faced
with such a threat is to flip a coin. By flipping a coin to determine who
should live, you ensure that the indivisible good of continuing one’s life is
distributed as fairly as is possible without wasting it.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In sections 2 and 3, I present
the main arguments that have been brought forward in favour of and against
the moral permissibility of killing a non-responsible threat in self-defence.
In section 4, I argue that all of these arguments rest on a misconception, and
that flipping a coin emerges as the right thing to do once this misconception
is corrected. In section 5, I compare and contrast a number of cases to test
the plausibility of the arguments brought forward earlier. In section 6, I
argue against the idea that a potential victim has a prerogative to save her
own life.
2 Arguments in Favour of Permissibility
Judith Thomson (1991, esp. pp. 300-3) argues that killing a non-responsible
threat in self-defence is permissible because a non-responsible threat loses
his right not to be killed once he starts threatening the life of his victim.
Thomson’s idea is that Bob loses his rights against you when he starts falling
towards you in a life-threatening manner without your having threatened his
life first. Given that Bob started falling towards you in this unprompted
way, Thomson believes that Bob would violate your right not to be killed if
he killed you. To Thomson, you have a right to enforce your right not to be
killed. This is why she concludes that Bob must have lost his right not to
be killed when he started falling towards you.
According to Thomson’s analysis, moral agency is not a necessary con-
dition either for forfeiting one’s rights or for violating someone else’s. Bob’s
3In this paper, my primary concern is with profiting non-responsible threats. Unless
stated otherwise, all references to non-responsible threats should thus be read as references
to profiting non-responsible threats. In the literature, the distinction between profiting
and non-profiting threats is not usually drawn. One exception is Victor Tadros, who
mentions the distinction, but thinks it irrelevant for his arguments. See Tadros, 2011, p.
248. For the remaining authors I mention in this paper, I will simply assume that they
mean their arguments to apply equally to both profiting and non-profiting non-responsible
threats.
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falling towards you is not something he is in control of or responsible for; it is
something that merely—and through no fault of his own—happens to him.
Thomson argues that it nevertheless grounds Bob’s liability4 to defensive
harm by making it the case that Bob is threatening to crush you, which for
her means that he is threatening to violate your right not to be killed.
Kamm (1992, pp. 45-55; 2012, p. 61)5 argues that Bob would have to
suffer greater harm to avoid harming you than an innocent bystander would
have to suffer to keep Bob from harming you. To give an example, Kamm
(1996, p. 96) thinks that if Bob could redirect himself away from you and
save your life at the cost of breaking his leg, then he would have to redirect
himself, even though an innocent bystander would not have to break one of
his legs to keep Bob from harming you. To Kamm (ibid.), if Bob is unable to
impose on himself the harm that he would be duty-bound to suffer for your
sake, others may impose it on him on his behalf. But why does Kamm think
that Bob’s moral standing vis-a`-vis you is weaker than that of an innocent
bystander? Kamm (1992, p. 47) claims that Bob’s falling towards you means
that he is “is headed to where [he] should not be, on the victim, who has a
right not to be occupied.” To Kamm (ibid.),“[one] simply has a right not to
have someone on the body or property to which one is entitled, even if the
wind put them there.” In Kamm’s view, Bob is thus liable to defensive harm
not because he threatens to violate your right not to be killed, but because
he threatens to violate your right not to be occupied. If either the victim or
the threat will be harmed very seriously, Kamm (1992, p. 54; 2012, p. 61)
claims that it is permissible to side with the victim, presumably because the
threat, but not the victim, is in a morally inappropriate position.
Like Kamm, Victor Tadros (2011, pp. 248-56) believes that Bob does not
threaten to violate your right not to be killed, but that he would nevertheless
have to suffer greater harm for your sake than an innocent bystander would
have to suffer. To Tadros, this is so because we have a special responsibility
for what our bodies do, even when what our bodies do is not a product of our
agency. Tadros furthermore argues that you may impose more harm on a
non-responsible threat than he has an enforceable duty to suffer. To Tadros
(2011, p. 148), the harm someone has an enforceable duty to suffer is the
harm that we may intentionally inflict on them when manipulatively using
4The language of liability was popularized by McMahan. Thomson does not use it,
though she is in effect relying on the same notion.
5See also Kamm, 1987, and Kamm, 1996, esp. p. 96.
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them as a means to promote some further end. But if you vaporize Bob,
you do not use him as a means; you merely eliminate him. Tadros (2011,
p. 244) thinks that eliminative harm is easier to justify than manipulative
harm, as only the latter involves seeing people as “material for use to
promote the greater good.”6 Given his idea that Bob would have to lose
a foot to keep himself from crushing you, Tadros (2011, p. 251) then
argues that once we “accommodate [the] difference between manipulative
and eliminative harming by [increasing] the cost that would have to be
borne by the threatening party”, it becomes plausible that you may kill Bob
eliminatively.
3 Arguments Against Permissibility
In contrast, Jeff McMahan and Michael Otsuka argue that a non-responsible
threat is not liable to defensive harm because he hasn’t done anything that
would justify a diminution in his moral status.7 Because they think it
impermissible to kill someone who is not liable to defensive harm in order
to save a single person, they conclude that it is impermissible to kill a non-
responsible threat in self-defence.8
McMahan (1994; 2002; 2005) argues that we become liable to lethal
defensive harm whenever we responsibly create a “forced choice between
lives” (McMahan, 2002, p. 403), or bring it about that either we or someone
else must die. Succinctly put, McMahan conceives of “the morality of self-
defence as a matter of justice in the distribution of harm” (McMahan,
2002, p. 402), and maintains that it is just to defensively impose harm on
someone only if that person is morally responsible for making its distribution
unavoidable. It follows that according to McMahan, it is unjust—and hence
impermissible—to kill a non-responsible threat in self-defence, as such a
threat by definition lacks moral responsibility for his threatening status, and
is thus not responsible for making the distribution of harm unavoidable.
6Tadros notes that his distinction between manipulative and eliminative agency
coincides with Warren Quinn’s distinction between opportunistic and eliminative direct
agency. See Quinn, 1989, p. 344.
7By the ‘moral status’ of a human person I mean the moral standing she enjoys vis-a`-
vis others. Someone’s moral status is higher the less we may do to her against her consent,
and the more we must do for her at some cost to ourselves or others.
8Kai Draper (1993) was an early defender of a view similar to McMahan’s and Otsuka’s.
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Otsuka (1994) starts from the observation that it is impermissible to
“ride roughshod”9 over an innocent bystander to save one’s own life. To
illustrate, imagine that a piano is falling towards you, and that the only
way to prevent it from crushing you is to vaporize it with your ray gun.
The problem is that if you shoot the piano, you will also end up vaporizing
Paul, an innocent stranger who is standing at one of the windows of the
building from which the piano is falling. May you vaporize the piano and
ride roughshod over Paul to save your life? Otsuka thinks it intuitively highly
plausible that you may not. He argues that if this is right, it should also
be impermissible to vaporize Bob, as there is no moral difference between
Paul and Bob. According to Otsuka, this can be seen by constructing an
intermediate case in which Paul no longer stands at the window, but sits—
through no action that would make him responsible for falling towards you—
on top of the falling piano. If you vaporize the piano, Paul dies; if you refrain
from using your ray gun, Paul survives unscathed, and you die. Otsuka
would maintain that shifting Paul’s location from ‘standing at the window’
to ‘sitting on top of the piano’ cannot make Paul liable to defensive harm.
Put differently, Otsuka denies that it can make a moral difference whether
an innocent person is located next to a threatening object or somehow ‘tied
up’ with it. Moving from the intermediate case to the non-responsible threat
case, Otsuka removes the piano from under Paul, so that it is now Paul’s
own weight that threatens to crush you. Otsuka would again assert that no
moral difference is involved in this move. To him, the fact that it is now
Paul’s own body that threatens to crush you cannot render it permissible
to vaporize Paul when before it wasn’t.
9This is Thomson’s terminology. See Thomson, 1991, p. 290.
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4 The Toss-Up Between a Profiting
Innocent Threat and His Victim
I believe that the arguments presented in the last two sections are misguided.
Here I explain why, and introduce what I take to be the right way of looking
at things.
4.1 The Misconception
The positions presented so far all identify a purportedly decisive moral
asymmetry between Bob and you. Given this, it seems likely that they are
based on considerations along the following lines: “It is either permissible
to kill a non-responsible threat in self-defence, or it is impermissible. Either
way, there has to be a moral asymmetry between the threatened person
and the threat, an asymmetry that favours either the victim, in which
case the killing is permissible, or the threat, in which case the killing is
impermissible. It is our task as moral philosophers to identify and explicate
this asymmetry.”
Thomson, Tadros, and Kamm identify an asymmetry that favours you.
Though labeled ‘non-responsible’ for threatening you, Bob is nevertheless
characterized as morally compromised in some way: he threatens to violate
your rights, finds himself in the wrong position vis-a`-vis you, or is responsible
for the harm his body threatens you with. Bob’s inappropriate relation to
you then grounds his liability to defensive harm, and makes it permissible
for you—the victim—to defend yourself.
McMahan and Otsuka identify an asymmetry that favours Bob. His
falling towards you merely happens to him; it is not something that he is
in control of. If he ends up harming you, he cannot reasonably be held
responsible for doing so. The same cannot be said of you. If you shoot your
ray gun, you do so voluntarily and deliberately, as a fully responsible moral
agent. Given his innocence, Bob cannot be liable to defensive harm, hence
you—the morally responsible agent—mustn’t shoot your ray gun.
Neither way of looking at things is wholly implausible. However, in
explicating various asymmetries, both miss the fundamental symmetry that
in my view characterizes the situation. Notice how similar Bob and you
really are. Bob is innocent; he cannot be blamed for falling towards you.
But you too are not to blame for the predicament you find yourself in! You
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did not know, and could not possibly have known, what you were getting
yourself into when you stepped into the well. Yet as things are, you can
save yourself only if you vaporize Bob, and Bob will survive only if he ends
up crushing you. Both Bob and you faultlessly find yourselves in perilous
situations from which you will escape only if an innocent other dies through
you. Given this fundamental symmetry, it seems promising to frame the
problem of the permissibility of killing a profiting non-responsible threat in
self-defence in distributive terms, and to think of the threat and his victim
as individuals with competing claims to the important good of continuing
one’s life (cf. Levine, 1984).
Insofar as Bob and you are similar, your claims to the good of a continued
life tie. But it would be rash to conclude that your claims are all things
considered equal, as there are important differences between the two of you
also. In the next section, I examine these differences, and discuss whether
they strengthen or weaken the non-responsible threat’s position vis-a`-vis his
potential victim.
4.2 Accounting for the Differences Between a Profiting
Innocent Threat and His Victim
A first important difference between Bob and you is that you act towards
Bob as a morally responsible agent, whereas whatever Bob does to you he
does to you merely qua falling body. McMahan and Otsuka believe this
asymmetry weighs crucially in Bob’s favour. Their idea is that Bob is not
liable to defensive harm because he hasn’t done anything that would justify
a reduction in his moral status. Given that Bob’s threatening you is not
something he is responsible for or in control of, Bob cannot sensibly be said
to be under a duty not to threaten you, and you cannot accordingly have a
right against him that he not threaten you. Bob, on the other hand, has a
right against you that you not kill him, and you have a duty not to kill him.
From Bob’s perspective, this way of looking at things appears plausible:
surely what Bob ought to avoid, he has to be able to avoid?
Thomson disagrees. Her idea is that we can threaten to violate a right,
and thus become liable to defensive harm, merely by being turned into a
threat. From Bob’s perspective, this way of looking at things is less com-
pelling than McMahan’s and Otsuka’s. Why should Bob accept a reduction
in his moral status because of something he is neither responsible for nor
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able to control? We can make better sense of Thomson’s view once we give
up the perspective of the threat, and consider the problem from the victim’s
point of view. From your perspective, your rights to non-interference enable
you to lead a self-determined life in accordance with your own interests by
giving you “primary say over what may be done to [you]” (Quinn, 1989, p.
309). Rights to non-interference make you sovereign over your own body:
they make it the case that other people are trespassing on your territory, and
may therefore be fought off, whenever they cross the protective boundary
that your rights to non-interference draw around you. As far as his impact
on you is concerned, Bob’s lack of responsibility is irrelevant. His body
threatens to damage yours, and unless you are permitted to fight Bob off,
this will have a negative effect on your ability to lead your life as you please
(Thomson, 1990, pp. 222-3). If we think of your rights to non-interference as
drawing a protective boundary around you that you have a right to enforce,
Bob is unlucky to be crossing that boundary entirely involuntarily and non-
responsibly, but that doesn’t change the fact that he is crossing it.
I believe that Thomson’s view contains an important truth. From your
perspective, if your rights to non-interference become ineffective against Bob
while his remain effective against you, Bob’s bad luck of being turned into
a threat is passed on to you, and this seems unjust. But Thomson’s view
has the contentious implication that ‘ought’ need not imply ‘can’, or that
Bob continues to be under a duty not to violate your rights even when
he has temporarily lost control over his actions. This strikes me—and
many others—as unacceptable. Kamm’s view faces a similar problem. Like
Thomson, Kamm focuses on the victim’s rights to non-interference, and
insists that these rights do not become wholly ineffective against a non-
responsible threat. If we are committed to the idea that ‘ought’ implies
‘can’, do we thus have to agree with McMahan and Otsuka that Bob is not
liable to defensive harm?
Tadros does not think so. He suggests we instead drop the assumption
that a person becomes liable to defensive harm only if he threatens to violate
another’s rights. To Tadros, Bob is liable to defensive harm because we are
all “responsible for what [our bodies do], even when that is not a product
of [our] agency”. simply because our bodies are—at least to some extent—
what we are (Tadros, 2011, p. 255).
What should we make of this idea? For McMahan and Otsuka, it might
8
simply beg the most important question. McMahan and Otsuka stress the
fact that Bob is a non-responsible threat; Tadros in essence denies that a
human person could be such a thing. McMahan and Otsuka might well agree
that we are responsible for what our bodies do to the extent that we are
able to control them, or are morally responsible for not being able to control
them. But why should—or how could—our responsibility for our bodies
extend beyond that? Suppose I own a piano which, for reasons beyond my
control, crushes you. How am I morally responsible for the harm the piano
causes merely because the piano is mine? Given this, I don’t think we should
agree with Tadros that Bob is responsible for what his body does. But then
what are we left with? Is the fact that Bob poses a threat to you as morally
irrelevant as McMahan and Otsuka claim it is?
Kamm and Tadros both base their arguments on the following observa-
tion: if Bob could avoid harming you, he would have to suffer substantial
harm to do so. This seems to me importantly right. If Bob could redirect
himself away from you to avoid crushing you, he would have to to do this
even if it would cost him a foot. But why would Bob have to sacrifice his
foot? In essence, because our morality is built around stringent rights to non-
interference, or on a strong presumption against harming innocent others.
As long as we are able to avoid harming innocent others, we generally have
to go to great lengths to do so. The mere fact that we lack responsibility for
finding ourselves in a situation where we pose a threat to innocent others
does not make it permissible to harm them. This is why Bob would have to
suffer substantial harm to avoid harming you if he could, or why Bob would
be violating your rights to non-interference if he crushed you when he could
have redirected himself away from you at reasonable cost to himself.
Moral rules that are built on a strong presumption against harming in-
nocent others neither allow us to minimize the harm that comes to innocent
persons, nor do they allow us to distribute harm equally among similarly
undeserving recipients. But they shield us from harm that is imposed on us
by other people as long as we do not inflict harm on others. In this way, they
provide us with the peace of mind that other people must not, in general,
threaten our physical integrity. Knowing that our bodies are largely off-
limits for those around us allows us to live together in peace while pursuing
our own interests.
Yet even if Bob would have to make great efforts to avoid harming you if
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he could, this seems to be no more than a hypothetical consideration. After
all, we have assumed that Bob cannot actually avoid harming you. You, on
the other hand, can avoid harming Bob. Given this, and given our morality’s
strong presumption against harming innocent others, doesn’t it follow that
given the way things actually are, you ought to refrain from shooting Bob?
To Tadros and Kamm, the reason why Bob would have to avoid harming
you if he could applies also when he cannot in fact avoid harming you. If
Bob were responsible for whatever his body did, or if you had a right against
Bob not to have Bob’s body on yours, this would hold true irrespective of
Bob’s ability to control his fall. But I have argued that Tadros and Kamm’s
ideas are not compelling. Contrary to what Tadros and Kamm suggest,
moral rights to non-interference are best thought of as held symmetrically
among moral agents. Qua moral agent, you have rights to non-interference
against other moral agents, and they have the same rights against you. Only
if one moral agent violates the rights of another is this symmetry disturbed
so that balance can be restored. The protective logic of our moral rights
to non-interference is thus built around—and for its functioning depends
on—the idea of mutual recognition between moral equals.
But note that if this is right, Bob retains his rights to non-interference
when he starts falling towards you not only because he lacks responsibility
for falling towards you. Lack of responsibility for threatening another is a
necessary condition for keeping one’s rights to non-interference, but it is not
sufficient. Bob also retains his rights because he retains his moral capacities,
or because he remains the kind of creature who would have to avoid harming
you if he could. In other words, if you must not vaporize Bob’s out-of-control
body, this is partly because Bob is the kind of creature who can understand
that if he could avoid crushing you, he would have a duty to do so. But if
you must constrain yourself towards Bob and let his body harm you partly
because Bob would (right now!) have to suffer substantial harm to avoid
crushing you if he could, it would be unjust if you could not impose that
harm on Bob on his behalf. By analogy, suppose that as a parent, you ask
your son to share his Halloween candy with his sister. You tell him that
sharing is appropriate partly because his sister would also have to share
her candy if she could. If so, it would be unjust and illogical if you made
your son share his candy, but forbade him to help himself to his share of his
sister’s candies that happened to be out of his sister’s reach but well within
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his.
But what about the fact that whatever harm you impose on Bob, you
impose on him as a morally responsible agent? Don’t you violate Bob’s
rights if you harm him? As long as you inflict no more harm on Bob
than he is duty-bound to suffer, you do not violate his rights to non-
interference. Whatever harm Bob is duty-bound to suffer, he would—as
a morally responsible agent—have to inflict on himself if he were able to.
There is thus a certain amount of harm that may rightfully be assigned to
Bob, given the situation he is in. Just as you may shove away a bystander
who is unwilling or unable to move out of the way when you are running
for your life, you can impose on Bob the more substantial harm he is duty-
bound to suffer without violating his rights (cf. Øverland, 2011, p. 550).
Having said that, burdening Bob with more harm than he is duty-bound
to suffer does not seem justifiable, and would therefore violate his rights to
non-interference.10
So far, I have argued that there is a justice-based reason to make a non-
responsible threat share in the costs that his out-of-control body threatens
to impose on his victim. To the extent that a non-responsible threat would
have to suffer harm to avoid harming his victim if he could do so, we may
redistribute harm from the victim to the threat. This does not imply that
Bob is liable to defensive harm. It merely means that his rights to non-
interference are permissibly infringeable to the extent that there is a justice-
based reason to make him bear part of the cost that he would otherwise
impose on his victim.
If what I have argued so far is correct, where does it leave us with
respect to the first asymmetry between Bob and you, i.e. the fact that
whatever harmful effects you have on Bob are due to your responsible agency,
whereas whatever harmful effects Bob has on you are not attributable to
his responsible agency? Compared to a responsible threat, the asymmetry
10Tadros claims that you are permitted to kill Bob because you would not be using
Bob as a means. I am not convinced by Tadros’ argument in favour of this claim. His
argument relies on the assumption that there are significant differences between two types
of intentional agency, so that eliminatively killing someone is no worse than manipulatively
cutting off their foot. At the same time, it is a consequence of his argument that liability to
defensive harm does not vary with the type of responsibility that grounds it. According to
Tadros, vicious threats, responsible threats, and non-responsible threats are all similarly
liable to defensive harm. But if ‘mode of agency’ is a significant consideration in one
context, why is it not significant when it comes to a person’s liability to defensive harm?
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weighs in Bob’s favour, but less decisively than McMahan and Otsuka have
argued. Though you would be permitted to kill a responsible threat in self-
defence, you are not similarly permitted to vaporize Bob to save yourself.
Instead, you have to take Bob’s lack of responsibility into account and let
Bob’s right to non-interference constrain you. But Bob’s moral status is not
thereby equal to that of an innocent bystander. If Bob could avoid crushing
you, he would have to suffer substantial harm to do so. This gives you a
justice-based reason to make Bob share in the harm that he is threatening
you with.
But Bob differs from an innocent bystander not only because he is
threatening you. Recall the innocent bystander Paul, who is standing at
one of the windows of a building from which a piano is falling towards
you. Imagine what would happen to Paul if we removed you from the
scene. Without you present, Paul could stand at the window and watch
the piano fall without any risk of harm. Bob’s situation is different. If you
weren’t there to cushion his fall, Bob would die on impact. Paul is thus
merely a bystander to a dangerous situation not only because he does not
threaten you, but also because his life is not at risk unless you involve him
in your problems. Bob, on the other hand, depends on you for his life.
Now by assumption, Bob’s depending on you for his life is not something
he is morally responsible for. But this does not suffice to make it morally
irrelevant. After all, Bob’s threatening you is also not something he is
morally responsible for, yet it still serves to morally distinguish him from an
innocent bystander. But why—and how—should Bob’s profiting from your
presence affect his moral standing vis-a`-vis you?
Thomson (1971, pp. 48-55) has famously claimed that if a world-class
violinist’s life were to depend on his being hooked up to your circulatory
system for the next nine months, you would be permitted to unhook yourself,
thus killing him. To Thomson, you have no duty to sacrifice nine months
of your life to avoid killing the violinist. Instead, she argues that his non-
responsible dependence on you weakens his moral standing vis-a`-vis you, so
that you may do more to him than you would be permitted to do to an
innocent bystander.11 Kamm (1992, pp. 20-45) argues that the violinist’s
11This is not to say that responsibility is irrelevant to the assessment of dependence
relations. If Bob were responsible for becoming dependent on you, his moral standing
vis-a`-vis you might well be more unfavourable than it is under the current circumstances,
where he depends on you entirely non-responsibly.
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dependence on you weakens his moral standing vis-a`-vis you because he
cannot be worse off through you than he would have been in your absence.
If you unplug the violinist, he dies; but in your absence, he would have
died anyway. Because of this, unplugging the violinist resembles letting him
die. While you may have to shoulder significant costs to avoid letting an
innocent other die, these costs are not usually thought to be as substantial
as the costs that you have to shoulder to avoid killing an innocent other
(Kamm, 1992, p. 71). Applied to the situation between you and Bob, if
you vaporize Bob, you kill someone who would have died in your absence.
By contrast, if you vaporize Paul, you kill someone who would have lived in
your absence. This distinguishes Bob from an innocent bystander such as
Paul.
The fact that a profiting threat depends on his victim not only distin-
guishes him from an innocent bystander; it also distinguishes him from his
victim. Bob is dangerous—a threat—to you, whereas you usefully cushion
Bob’s fall at best, or do not substantially alter his predicament at worst (if
you vaporize him, he dies, but without you there, he would have died any-
way). From a self-interested perspective, Bob thus welcomes your presence,
whereas you cannot be said to welcome his. Following Thomson and Kamm,
I think that this difference strengthens your moral standing vis-a`-vis Bob.
It does not give you license to treat Bob in any way you like, but it does
seem to give you an advantage over Bob. Given that you are an innocent
other who improves Bob’s chances of survival, whereas Bob is an innocent
other who worsens your chances of survival, Bob should have to make an
extra effort to avoid harming you if he could.
4.3 Weighing Claims
So far, I have argued that there is a justice-based reason to impose on Bob
the substantial harm that he would be duty-bound to suffer for your sake.
Does this shed any light on the relative strengths of Bob’s and your claim
to the good of a continued life?
Suppose first that Bob was a non-profiting threat. I have argued that
given our morality’s strong presumption against harming innocent others,
Bob would have to suffer substantial harm to avoid harming you if he could.
But would he be required to subjugate his own interests entirely to yours? I
don’t think so. But why not? Given a strong presumption against harming
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innocent others, why shouldn’t Bob have to do whatever it takes to avoid
killing you? Recall the innocent bystander Paul, whose life you are required
to spare at the cost of your own. It may be very demanding to let yourself
be crushed by a falling piano when you could in principle vaporize it. Yet
given our morality’s strong presumption against harming innocent others,
you are at most excused if you vaporize the piano and kill Paul. But if you
have to avoid killing Paul at the cost of your life, why wouldn’t Bob have to
avoid killing you at the cost of his life?
The important difference is this. You avoid harming Paul as long as you
do not harm anyone, whereas Bob avoids harming you only if he inflicts harm
on himself. Because Bob has to inflict harm on himself to avoid harming
you, Bob can at most be required to share equally in the harm that his
body threatens to impose on you. If he were required to pick up the lion’s
share, this would deny him the right, qua moral agent, to regard harm
that he imposed on himself as on a par with harm that he let come to you.
Given Bob’s innocence, this would be an alienating requirement. Even if our
morality is built on a strong presumption against harming innocent others,
when avoiding harm to an innocent other means inflicting that harm on our
innocent selves, we must not be required to treat ourselves as below par.
Such a requirement would be inconsistent with a proper sense of self-worth.
Should Bob be permitted to give more weight to his own interests? If
Bob harms you, he merely allows himself to harm you, and he merely foresees
that harm will come to you. Allowing harm is often thought less bad than
actively inflicting it, and merely foreseeing harm is often thought less bad
than intending it. Does this mean that Bob should not have to intentionally
inflict as much harm on himself than he lets come to you? Suppose you are
the front passenger in a car whose driver starts fainting just as the car comes
up behind a pedestrian. If you do nothing, the car will hit the pedestrian.
Is the harm that you are required to suffer to avoid hurting the pedestrian
reduced by the fact that whatever harm that you let come to him is neither
intended nor actively inflicted? If you had already taken the wheel and
started steering when you noticed the pedestrian, would this increase the
harm that you would be required to suffer to avoid hurting the pedestrian?
My hunch is: not by much. Why could that be so? It seems to me that our
duties to avoid harming others are requirements to regard their bodies as
territory that we need to steer clear of in the pursuit of our own interests.
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The main failure of respect involved in harming an innocent person is not
regarding that person’s body as off-limits for one’s purposes. This holds true
for all modes of harming, and it makes them all similarly bad. In other
words, even if Bob’s mode of harming you is less disrespectful than other
modes, Bob’s attitude towards you is nevertheless very inappropriate if he
fails to redirect himself away from you at moderate cost to himself.
To what extent might Bob’s relatively respectful mode of harming you
work in his favour? Out of two comparable options, Bob should probably be
allowed to pick that option which slightly favoured his interests over yours. If
one option gave both of you an equal chance of survival, and a second option
improved Bob’s chances (while reducing yours) by a couple of percentage
points, Bob should probably be permitted to go with the second option. But
note that we have not yet factored in the consideration that Bob is a profiting
non-responsible threat. Taken by itself, the fact that Bob benefits from your
presence cannot be of overriding importance. Whether other people’s mere
presence happens to be beneficial or burdensome to us is mostly a matter
of our good or bad luck. Having said that, whether a person’s presence
is beneficial or burdensome is not entirely morally insignificant, as it can
change the extent to which harming that person is disrespectful. In this
way, it seems to me that a profiting threat would act unduly disrespectfully
if he did not treat his victim’s interests as on a par with his own. Suppose
that as a profiting threat, Bob could again choose between two options, the
first of which gave both of you an equal chance of survival, and the second
of which was slightly skewed in his favour. Further suppose that Bob argued
as follows: “I must not be required to pick the first option. That option is
maximally demanding. It is the upper limit of what can be required of me
without undermining my self-worth. Given that I do not trespass on my
victim’s territory in an especially disrespectful way, I should be cut some
slack.” It is not a profiting threat’s place to argue in this manner. For even if
Bob has to pick the maximally demanding option, he still has a 50% chance
of survival, whereas if it weren’t for you, he would simply die. Also, even
if Bob has to pick the maximally demanding option, there is still a 50%
chance that you will die, whereas in Bob’s absence, your life would not be at
risk. Given that circumstances have put Bob in such a favourable situation
vis-a`-vis you, Bob’s attitude towards you should be one of humility. At
any rate, he should not appeal to otherwise legitimate but relatively weak
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considerations to discount your interests relative to his own. It follows that
a profiting non-responsible threat is morally required to treat his victim’s
interests as on a par with his own. From a distributive perspective, this
allows us to conclude that Bob and you have similarly strong claims to the
good of a continued life.
4.4 The Distributive Perspective
When different people have similarly strong claims to a good, it is fair to
assign equal amounts of it to each of them (Broome, 1984; Broome, 1991).
In non-responsible threat cases, however, the good in question is indivisible.
You cannot give half of a continued life to Bob and keep the other half to
yourself. The only way in which you can assign equal shares is by vaporizing
yourself, thus letting Bob fall to his death. That way, both of you end
up with a share of zero. But this maximally fair solution is unacceptably
wasteful.12 If it is possible to strike a balance between fairness and efficiency,
‘continuing one’s life’ is too valuable a resource to sacrifice for maximal
fairness.
Broome suggests that when we are distributing an indivisible good be-
tween candidates with equally strong claims, we should hold a lottery in
which all candidates are given an equal chance of winning the good. This
avoids wastefulness, and the requirement of fairness is met to a considerable
degree (Broome, 1991, pp. 97-8; original emphasis):
“[If the good in question is indivisible and we don’t want to
let it go to waste], the candidates’ claims cannot all be equally
satisfied, because some candidates will get the good and others
will not. So some unfairness is inevitable. But a sort of partial
equality in satisfaction can be achieved. Each person can be
given a sort of surrogate satisfaction. By holding a lottery, each
can be given an equal chance of getting the good.”
Following Broome, we may thus conclude that as a potential victim of a
non-responsible threat, you should flip a coin. You—a morally responsible
agent—are charged with the distribution of an indivisible good. By ‘charged’
I mean: It just so happens that an important good needs distribution, and
that you will end up distributing it, in that your action or inaction will
12Note that it is not Pareto efficient.
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inevitably determine how the good is distributed. Given this, you should
aim at a distributively just solution, and should thus give an equal chance
of getting the good to Bob and yourself. If you do this, your action properly
reflects the equal moral standing Bob and you enjoy as individuals (cf.
Broome, 1984, p. 38; Levine, 1984, p. 70; Davis, 1984, pp. 919-2; Lazar,
2009, p. 715) as well as the great value of the good in question (because
you refuse to let it go to waste). If you shoot Bob without flipping a coin
first, you rob Bob of his rightful chance to continuing his life. This chance is
valuable: it represents the ‘surrogate satisfaction’ of Bob’s claim to the good
of a continued life, given the scarcity and the indivisibility of the good in
question. It follows that you must not shoot Bob without holding a lottery
first.13
5 Comparing Innocent Threat Cases
So far, I have argued for the following claims:
1. Compared to an innocent bystander, Bob non-responsibly depends on
you for his life. This weakens his moral standing vis-a`-vis you.
2. Compared to an innocent bystander, Bob non-responsibly threatens
your life. This weakens his moral standing vis-a`-vis you further.
Here, I want to test whether our intuitions are in line with these claims.
To do this, I will alter the Original Case presented in the introduction
by removing the factors that I have argued work to Bob’s disadvantage.
If (1) and (2) are correct, we should judge that Bob’s moral position is
strengthened as we move from one case to the next.
13May you let yourself be crushed without flipping a coin first? It seems to me that
while such a heroic act of self-sacrifice is not morally required, there is nothing wrong with
your freely choosing it. Thomson (2008) would disagree. She argues that “a willingness
to give up one’s life simply on learning that [someone else] will live if and only if one dies
is a sign of a serious moral defect in a person” (ibid., p. 366, original emphasis), as it
is indicative of the fact that one values one’s own life insufficiently. While I agree that
proper respect for persons has to include proper self-regard, it does not seem to me that
such self-regard is incompatible with a willingness to sacrifice oneself for an unspecified
stranger. In the case at hand and given your innocence, I would think proper self-regard
incompatible with a denial that you have a rightful claim to continuing your life, but not
with the fact that you may rightfully choose to waive such a claim.
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Case A
(α) Bob does not profit from you;
(β) Bob is a threat to you
The setup here is the same as in the Original Case, except for the bottom of
the well now being laid out with protective padding. If you do nothing and
let Bob crush you, you still die, but it is now the protective padding that
cushions Bob’s fall.
Given the setup of Case A, Bob is still intimately tied up with what
poses a threat to you, but now your presence is no longer necessary for his
survival. Rather, your absence would now guarantee his safety. If given a
choice, Bob would thus want you gone. Without you there, Bob would not
have to deal with the prospect of crushing (or else being vaporized by) an
innocent stranger, and the protective padding would safely cushion his fall.
Intuitively, I feel that Bob’s moral position vis-a`-vis you is strengthened
as we move from the Original Case to Case A. This means that my intuitions
are in line with the idea that Bob’s depending on you works to his moral
disadvantage.
In addition to the arguments already presented, there is one further
theoretical consideration that supports this intuitive judgement. Suppose
we follow Warren Quinn (1989) and (more recently) Jonathan Quong (2009)
in spelling out the Kantian idea of ‘using someone as a mere means’ in a
counterfactual way, so that X uses Y as a mere means whenever X harms
Y without Y’s consent, thereby achieving something X would not have been
able to achieve in Y’s absence, Bob uses you as a mere means in the Original
Case, but not in A. Under such a counterfactual definition of the term, my
intuitive judgements thus suggest that in the Original Case, Bob’s moral
status is weakened by the fact that he uses you as mere means.14
14Quinn (1989, p. 344) refers to using someone in this way as “direct opportunistic
agency”. and claims that it is especially hard to justify. Quong (2009, p. 525) agrees
that there is something “particularly wrong” with harming someone in this way. When it
comes to profiting non-responsible threats, there is the complication that the threat lacks
control over his action, and can thus not be accused of “direct opportunistic agency”. But
if a threat harms his victim without the victim’s consent, thereby securing his survival (that
he would not otherwise have been able to secure), this seems to me sufficient to conclude
that he—entirely non-responsibly—uses his victim as a mere means in a counterfactual
sense. As I have argued in section 4, our moral standing vis-a`-vis each other does not
depend exclusively on what we do to each other as morally responsible agents; the effects
we have on others merely in virtue of our existence as embodied creatures can be morally
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In Case A, would it be wrong of you to flip a coin to determine who
should live? As discussed, flipping a coin seems to me very much an upper
limit of what could be required of Bob if he were able to control his fall;
accordingly, a 50% chance of death seems to me very much an upper limit
of what it would be permissible to impose on Bob in Case A. If you saw an
option to give Bob a slight advantage over yourself, I think that you ought
to go with that option instead of flipping a coin.
Case B
(α) Bob does not profit from you;
(β) Bob is not a threat.
This case is like Case A, except that the thugs throw a spear down the well
before they throw in Bob. If you do not shoot your ray gun, your heart will
be pierced by the spear, and Bob will then land on your dead body. You
can either vaporize Bob and the spear at one go, or you can let your heart
be pierced by the spear. The spear poses no threat to Bob. Moreover, if
there were no spear, the impact of Bob’s body on yours would cause you no
harm.
In Case B, Bob and what’s threatening you are entirely separable. That
is, we can remove Bob from the scene without removing the threat, and we
can remove the threat without removing Bob (so that Bob’s presence is no
longer sufficient for your life to be at risk). In Case B, if anything can be
said to differentiate Bob from an innocent bystander, it seems to be mere
spatial location—Bob is falling towards you, whereas innocent bystanders
are usually assumed to stand some distance apart.
I feel that the Bob of Case B is morally indistinguishable from an
innocent bystander whom you mustn’t ride roughshod over. Intuitively,
such a bystander has to incur moderate costs to move out of the way so that
you can save yourself, but his duties are much more limited than those of a
non-responsible threat. In B, it would therefore be impermissible to flip a
coin to decide who of you should live.
significant also.
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6 A Prerogative to Save One’s Own Life?
I shall now consider an important objection to the idea that when faced with
a profiting non-responsible threat, one ought to flip a coin. The objection
can be put as follows: “From an impartial point of view, the claims of
a non-responsible threat and his potential victim may indeed tie. But it
does not follow from this that the potential victim has to treat both claims
equally, as he is not required to take up an impartial perspective. Given
that his own life is at stake, the victim may give more weight to his own
interests, and may permissibly treat his own claim as the more significant
one.” Nancy Davis (1984) and Jonathan Quong (2009) have both presented
such a prerogative-based argument in favour of the permissibility of killing
non-responsible threats in self-defence.15 In the following, I focus on Quong’s
argument, and explain why I think it fails.
Quong (2009, p. 518) comes up with and defends a general principle
called the Principle of Defensive Killing (PDK). The PDK states that “[you]
can permissibly kill [another person] X if X will otherwise kill you”, provided
that “(i) killing X is the only reasonable course of action that can save your
life, and (ii) you have not waived or forfeited your permission to act in self-
defense.” (ibid.). According to the PDK, you are allowed to vaporize Bob
because unless you do so, Bob will kill you, and because your vaporizing him
is in compliance with (i) a proportionality and (ii) a ‘no forfeiture’ clause.
Like Thomson, Kamm, and Tadros, Quong argues unambiguously in
favour of the permissibility of killing a non-responsible threat. His approach
nevertheless differs from theirs in at least two important respects. Firstly,
while Thomson, Kamm, and Tadros claim that you may kill Bob because
he threatens to violate your rights or because he is liable to defensive harm,
Quong thinks you may kill Bob simply because he will kill you unless you kill
him. Secondly, Quong (2009, p. 519) argues (contra Thomson and Tadros)
that responsible agency is necessary for violating another’s rights as well as
for becoming liable to defensive harm. To Quong, when Bob starts falling
towards you, he neither threatens to violate your rights, nor does he become
liable to defensive harm. Unlike Thomson and Kamm, Quong is therefore
not committed to the counterintuitive claim that ‘ought’ need not imply
‘can’. Moreover, unlike Thomson, Kamm, and Tadros, he is not committed
15Levine (1984, esp. p. 74) presents a similar argument, but rejects it.
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to the revisionist claim that responsible agency is not a necessary condition
for liability.
Instead, Quong appeals to the idea of a prerogative to justify the PDK.
When an agent’s own life is at stake, Quong (2009, pp. 516-7) thinks that the
“agent-relative value each person’s life has for them” grounds a “powerful
agent-relative permission to avoid sacrificing or significantly risking their
own life for the sake of others [...].” While Quong does not argue that such a
prerogative implies a general permission to kill an innocent person whenever
doing so would serve to save one’s own life, Quong does believe that an agent
may permissibly kill an innocent person to save his own life just in case he
does not use that person as a mere means. Whether an agent uses another
person as a mere means is decided through consideration of a counterfactual:
if the agent would not be able to secure his own survival if the other person
were not present, the agent uses that person as a mere means. Quong (2009,
p. 525) appeals to a Kantian idea of respect to argue that there is something
“particularly wrong” with harmfully using someone as a mere means, so
that our otherwise powerful prerogative to save our own life cannot extend
to killings that involve such use. Quong then claims that according to his
definition of using as a mere means, no one is used as a mere means in the
cases that the PDK captures, simply because where X is what threatens
to kill you, removing X does not make it impossible for you to secure your
survival—rather, it guarantees it.
At first sight, Quong does not seem to miss the fundamental symmetry
that I have argued characterizes non-responsible threat cases. Quong would
agree that from an impartial point of view, Bob’s and your claim to the
good of a continued life tie. In fact, Quong insists that neither the non-
responsible threat nor his potential victim lose their respective rights not to
be killed, and that both threat and victim retain their right to self-defence,
in that according to the PDK, they may permissibly infringe the other’s
right not to be killed (Quong, 2009, p. 525; see also Davis, 1984, p. 193).
In sum, Quong seems to offer a clear and elegant solution to the problem of
self-defence against non-responsible threats that is consistent with the view
that the situation between a profiting non-responsible threat and his victim
is roughly symmetric from an impartial point of view.
On closer inspection, however, our Original Case points to a weakness
in Quong’s account. Succinctly put, the problem is that Quong’s PDK does
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not match up with the rationale he provides in its favour. According to the
PDK’s wording, the situation between Bob and you is indeed symmetric as
I have sketched it in the above paragraph. But according to its rationale,
the situation is asymmetrical: given that Bob would be using you as a mere
means if he were to kill you, he would—according to the PDK’s rationale—
have no right to kill you. If he could smash your ray gun, he would thus
be disallowed from doing so, even if he knew that you will shoot him if
he doesn’t. The letter of the PDK thus allows certain killings that its
justification forbids.16
To make matters worse, there are killings that seem intuitively imper-
missible, but that according to the PDK’s justification we ought to endorse.
Consider again Paul, the innocent bystander. If you vaporize the piano,
you save your life without using Paul as a mere means, as Paul’s presence
makes no difference to your ability to vaporize the piano (Otsuka, 1994, p.
77; Hanna, 2012). In fact, you would welcome Paul’s absence, as you could
then vaporize the piano without also killing an innocent person. It follows
that according to the PDK’s rationale, it is permissible to vaporize Paul.
I agree with most other moral philosophers that this is an unacceptable
implication.17
Why does the PDK run into these problems? The underlying issue seems
to me the following. Quong thinks that the agent-relative value each person’s
life has for them makes it sometimes permissible to kill an innocent person
in order to save one’s own life. He tries to substantiate what he means by
‘sometimes’. both by formulating a rule-like principle (the PDK), and by
providing a rationale in its favour. While it may be possible to come up
with a rule-like principle that matches our intuitions about specific cases,
the search for an adequate rationale with genuine explanatory power may
well be a futile one. Killing an innocent person simply because one puts
one’s own interests first sounds like a gravely disrespectful thing to do, and
I doubt that there is a convincing rationale why doing so should sometimes
be thought morally justifiable (as opposed to merely excusable). For any
16This assumes that intentional agency is not a necessary condition for ‘using as a mere
means’. Quong might want to disagree with this. See footnote 14.
17Quong is aware that the PDK’s rationale sanctions killing Paul, and is willing to accept
this implication of the PDK (that is, he thinks that we ought to reconsider our intuitions
about the permissibility of killing innocent bystanders such as Paul). See Quong, 2009,
pp. 529-30.
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proposed rationale, I thus conjecture that it will be possible to construct
counterexamples to it, i.e. cases in which the rationale permits killings that
we find intuitively wrong.
I therefore propose a different approach. I suggest we take as a start-
ing point cases where substantial harm needs distribution among innocent
individuals and where one may clearly put one’s own interests first, to see
if a plausible constraint on agent-relative prerogatives emerges. What are
cases where substantial harm needs distribution among equally undeserving
individuals, and where we do not doubt that the special value each person’s
life has for them grounds a prerogative to put one’s own interests first?
Suppose that you are out hiking in the woods with an innocent stranger
when you chance upon a hungry bear (Boorse and Sorensen, 1988, p. 115).
The bear starts charging, and it is evident that he will eat either you or the
innocent stranger depending on who manages to run faster. Do the two of
you have to flip a coin in order to determine who may run and who has to
stay put? Of course not. You may simply run as fast as you can. It is not
morally required that either of you be given a fair chance to survive; even
if you are confident that you are able to run much faster than the stranger,
you may still run for your life, thus leaving the other behind (Boorse and
Sorensen, 1988, pp. 115-6). What it intuitively seems you must not do is
stab the stranger with your hunting knife in order to slow him down.
To return to our Original Case, suppose the bottom of the well were
large enough for you to step aside, so that you could save your own life
without killing Bob, but by merely letting him die. In such circumstances,
it seems to me again obvious that you would be permitted to secure your
own survival, despite the fact that Bob is innocent, and despite the fact
that stepping aside would mean his certain death. What makes the Original
Case tricky is the fact that you cannot save your own life without killing
Bob.18 Can these intuitions be said to capture a moral principle? At the
very least, they are consistent with the following constraint on agent-relative
prerogatives (CAP):
18Elsewhere, Quong agrees that the distinction between harming an innocent other and
allowing him to be harmed is morally significant. See Quong, 2012, p. 63, fn. 29.
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CAP. It is impermissible to depart from an impartial point of
view and give more weight to your own interests if you can do so
only by inflicting harm on another person that this person would
not be duty-bound to suffer for your sake.
To violate the CAP is to make an exception of yourself in a morally objec-
tionable way: it is to pursue your own interests in precisely the way you are
morally asked not to pursue them. If you inflict harm on another person that
this person is not required to suffer for you, you trespass on another person’s
sovereign territory that morality clearly flags as ‘off-limits’ for you. But why
is each of us morally entitled to territory of their own? Why is our morality
based on such a strong presumption against harming innocent others? Note
first that we are social beings. As such, we lead our lives surrounded by
other people. Second, we are rational creatures. As such, we have our own
plans and projects, and we aspire to lead our lives in accordance with them.
Third, we are embodied creatures: if someone harms our bodies, they harm
us. Stringent rights to non-interference enable us to live together peacefully
while still pursuing our own interests. Only if there is a general—as well as
generally accepted—rule that we must avoid harming each other can we go
about our lives without constantly seeing each other as potential threats.
If the CAP did not exist, or if people constantly ignored it, this would
undermine the function of our stringent rights to non-interference. To violate
the CAP is thus to pursue your own good in a way that is not universalizable.
The situation presents itself differently if you are able to pursue your own
good without trespassing on someone else’s sovereign territory. In that case,
a permission to put your own interests first need not undermine our general
ability to pursue our own interests while living together peacefully. It follows
that if you can pursue your own interests without trespassing on anyone
else’s sovereign territory, then you are in luck: an agent-relative prerogative
may well apply to you.
Suppose this is roughly right, and something like the CAP does in fact
apply. There are then no circumstances under which you have a prerogative
to kill an innocent other in order to save your own life. Also, the only
reason why you don’t have to let Bob crush you, but may instead flip a
coin to determine who of you should live, is because flipping a coin is the
impartially right thing to do. When it comes to Bob and you, we can take




Given the abstract nature of the cases discussed in this paper, it may not
be immediately obvious why clarifying the moral status of a profiting non-
responsible threat is relevant to political philosophy. Bob is not only a
peculiar creature from a moral point of view; he is also a rare occurrence
in real life. But once we keep in mind that Bob is a stylized version of an
innocent person who happens to impose on innocent others, it should become
clear that the issues discussed in this paper are relevant to problems that
can arise in any violent context, but that are maybe especially prone to arise
in the context of terrorism.
For a fairly realistic example, suppose that terrorists have set a bus of
civilians on a path to a steep drop. On an observation deck above the drop,
a crowd of civilians is enjoying the view. If the bus crashes into the crowd,
it will slow down sufficiently so that it doesn’t go over the edge and into the
ravine. If the bus crashes into the crowd, most of the passengers on the bus
will get away with minor injuries, but many individuals in the crowd will be
killed. If the bus goes over the edge, it is unlikely that any of its passengers
will survive. Roughly the same number of people will be killed if the bus
plows into the crowd as would be killed if it went over the edge instead. If
the only way to stop the bus before it reaches the unsuspecting crowd is to
blow it up (thus killing most of the passengers on the bus), should the bus
be stopped, or should the decision be made to let it run into the crowd?
As a general rule, a government must not order the killing of a group
of civilians in order to keep another group from being killed. In this paper,
I have argued that in the just sketched example, we are dealing with an
19Given our morality’s strong presumption against harming innocent others, wouldn’t
it be better for an otherwise uninvolved bystander not to intervene? I don’t think so. A
strong presumption against harming innocent others means that innocent people will not
usually be duty-bound to bear much harm. But when in exceptional circumstances they
are bound to bear a certain amount of harm, we should intervene to ensure that the right
people are harmed to the right extent. Also, even if flipping a coin is the impartially right
thing to do, an uninvolved bystander may still have an agent-relative prerogative not to
intervene. That is, our morality may not be as demanding as to require that a bystander
run the risk of having to kill an innocent person in order to give another innocent person
a fair chance to survive.
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exception to this general rule. The passengers on the bus are profiting non-
responsible threats.20 As such, they would have to suffer substantial harm
to divert the bus away from the crowd if they saw an opportunity to do
so. This grounds a justice-based reason to make them share in the harm
that they are about to impose on the crowd. The fact that they depend
on the crowd’s presence for their lives weakens their moral status vis-a`-vis
the individuals in the crowd further. Given this, the Special Forces team on
location should be instructed to give an equal chance of survival to both the
civilians on the bus and those in the crowd.
What if the people in the crowd had the means to blow up the bus
without outside help? According to the argument that I have presented in
this paper, we have no prerogative to kill innocent others to save our own
lives. But if the individuals in the crowd found a way to move out of the bus’
way, they would be permitted to do that. I have suggested that when we
can put our own interests first without inflicting harm on innocent others,
we may well have a prerogative to do so.
20In this example, it is not the passengers’ bodies that endanger the people on the
observation deck; it is the out-of-control bus that they are sitting in. Does it still make
sense to characterize the passengers as threats? I think so. Qua moral agent, Bob happens
to be trapped inside his out-of-control body, whereas the passengers happen to be trapped
inside an out-of-control bus. Like Bob, who would have to steer himself away from you if
he could, the passengers on the bus would have to steer the bus away from the crowd if
they could. If Bob chose not to redirect himself at moderate cost to himself, he would be
violating your rights to non-interference; if the passengers on the bus chose not to steer
themselves away from the crowd at moderate cost to themselves, they would be violating
the rights to non-interference of the people on the observation deck. This suggests that
a non-responsible threat can be characterized as someone who is inside an object that he
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